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University Press.  2018.  230 pp. £80.00. ISBN 978 1 5261 1482 2. Available as e-book. 
 
Elke Schwarz's Death Machines is a fascinating, stimulating, and at times frustrating 
book.  The fascination comes from a comprehensive reconsideration of the work of Hannah 
Arendt and of the transformation of the meaning of politics into the biopolitical management 
of life which underpins ethical discourses of violence, relying on a quasi-encyclopaedic breadth 
of research.  The stimulation arises through Schwarz's convincing demonstration of the need 
for a radical rejection of the "scientific-technological perspective" (158) which, along and 
through technologies, "clearly shift the horizon of ethical thought and practice" (119) and 
foreclose certain avenues for ethical thinking.  The frustration, meanwhile, arises from a book 
that simultaneously accomplishes much more and somewhat less than what it portends. 
 The first thing to note about Death Machines is that while the subtitle might be about 
the "ethics of violent technologies", it deals rather tangentially with both ethics and violent 
technologies.  Rather, Schwarz explores here "the ethicality of ethics itself" (124) in modern 
political violence.  Her central contention in this book is that the increasing recourse to violent 
technological means of war – such as armed drones, or increasingly autonomous weapons 
systems – is undergirded by a biopolitical mode of thinking which considers the securitization 
of life as the central aim of politics.  This replacement of proper politics by administration, in 
turn, shifts the ethical terrain, drawing on a medical vocabulary to justify the targeted 
elimination of diseases of the political body (135), enabling violent practices without 
consideration of their ethical justification.  In other words, in a biopolitical world, the question 
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is no longer whether killing can be justified, but how to kill more effectively, and kill better 
(177). 
 I say this book accomplishes more than it appears due to its comprehensive critique of 
biopolitical modern politics, which stands very well on its own, without the context of violent 
technologies.  Drawing on a very perceptive reading of Hannah Arendt's work – particularly 
The Human Condition – Schwarz demonstrates the presence of a clear biopolitical strain in 
Arendt's work, hanging on the distinction between free action in a political realm, and the 
administration of life – as an exercise in risk-management – in a political realm that has merged 
with the social.  Schwarz further extends this reading by incorporating Arendt's work on 
violence, noting the continuity between "the biopolitical anti-politics of modernity" (96) and 
violence which arises as a palliative to the absence of politics.  This, she argues, plays out 
directly in the way "violent technologies [appear] as a solution to political problems" (168-
169), notably in the seemingly endless extension of campaigns of targeted killing. 
 This biopolitical reading of Arendt, which occupies more than half the book, extends 
far beyond the problem of violent technologies, and would easily have merited a book-length 
treatment on its own.  Conversely, however, it means that the book gets to the specific problem 
of violent technologies rather late.  When getting to violent technologies, the book offers few 
specifics.  Schwarz discusses alternatively fully autonomous weapons systems which are 
expected in the near to medium future, military robotics combined with human soldiers, and 
remote piloted aircraft (drones).  Schwarz engages very sparingly with the practices enabled 
by the development of these technologies, preferring to concentrate on the conditions under 
which the use of these technologies – in the abstract – becomes justified.  While the conflation 
of fully autonomous, partially automated and remote-controlled weapons systems may 
displease certain more practically-oriented scholars of war studies, Schwarz hereby remains 
true to the guiding argument of her book.  In her view, to engage with the specific ethics of 
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remote-controlled and automated weapons constitutes an acceptance of the biopolitical 
perversion of politics which treats humans as specimens of biological life to be secured, 
managed, controlled, and guided. 
 In Schwarz's view, furthermore, even partial automation of warfare and ethical 
decisions collapses ethics into "narrowed horizons for ethical debate" (172).  In this frame, 
ethics is no longer considered as a means to engaging in political action, but rather as a code, 
which must be followed, notwithstanding the actual results (131).  This is most visible in fully 
autonomous weapons, which are purported to be 'better' at ethics than humans, and in which 
ethics is quite literally a code, a succession of commands which a machine follows, thereby 
progressively erasing the human, "that must fit into logic of the machine" (184).  Schwarz 
traces how the same language of calculating, unreflecting ethics pervades all parts of military 
ethics, in which computer programs simulate, estimate, and calculate casualty numbers and 
acceptable levels of risk (131_.  Finally, in this vein, Schwarz highlights what this biopolitical, 
calculating form of bioethics erases: anything that cannot be systematically calculated – 
psychological injury, the destructive effect on social life of overflying drones, non-fatal 
injuries, losses of limbs, destruction of symbolic property, etc. is thereby left out of ethical 
assessments (198).  All that matters is the most easily calculable category – life and death.  In 
this, Schwarz argues, bioethics – the ethics of life – become necroethics – the ethics of death. 
 In summary, Death Machines offers a persuasive and richly elaborated discussion of 
the slippage of ethical categories which underpins the use of increasingly automated 
technologies of violence, leading to an ever more pervasive recourse to violence.  As such, 
Schwarz's book should be essential reading to scholars across wide fields in (critical) war 
studies, political theory, and political philosophy.  Furthermore, the extensive discussion of 
Arendt's biopolitics will appeal to Arendtian scholars and scholars of biopolitics more widely. 
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